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Criminal RICO Forfeitures and the Eighth
Amendment: "Rough" Justice
Is Not Enough
Introduction
The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act of 1970
(RICO),1 as amended by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of
1984,2 provides for the forfeiture3 of "interests" connected with a RICO
violation. "Interests" has been broadly defined by the amended statute4
and broadly interpreted by the Supreme Court: "Every property interest,
including a right to profits or proceeds, may be described as an interest."5
The legitimate interests of a RICO enterprise6 are indivisible from its
"tainted" interests.7 "Tainted" interests are thosethat afford a source of
influence over a RICO enterprise,' or that are denved from or generated
by RICO violations.9
1. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat.
941 (1970) (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
2. Comprehensive Crime Control Act, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984). In
addition, the Act amended the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) Statute, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1265 (current version at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), which also
provides for the penalty of forfeiture in personam. For the legislative history and purpose of
the Comprehensive Crime Control Act, see 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3182.
Although addressing only the RICO statute, this Note's principles and analyses also ap-
ply to the CCE statute. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Col. 1985) (in
personam forfeiture provisions of RICO and the drug (CCE) statute are almost identical and
have the same objectives).
3. Forfeiture is "[slomething to which the right is lost by the commission of a crime or
fault or the losing of something by way of a penalty." BLACK's LAW DIcTIONARY 584 (5th
ed. 1979). Criminal forfeiture is the "post-conviction divestiture of the defendant's property
or financial interest that has an association with his criminal activities." Note, Criminal For-
feiture: Attacking the Economic Dimension of Organized Narcotics Trafficking, 32 AM. U.L.
REv. 227, 229 (1982).
4. The amended provisions of section 1963 provide in subsection (a)(3) for the forfeiture
of property constituting or derived from proceeds obtained directly or indirectly from viola-
tions of section 1962. See 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1)-(3) (Supp. III 1985).
5. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 22 (1983).
6. See infra note 23 for a definition of "enterprise."
7. See, e.g., United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1349 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1005 (1984); United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 857 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 825 (1983).
8. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(l)-(2) (Supp. III 1985).
9. Id. at § 1963(a)(3). See also Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16 (1983) (insurance
proceeds from arson fraud held forfeitable); United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1341
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To what extent must tainted interests be present in a RICO enter-
prise before a RICO forfeiture satisfies the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion against cruel and unusual punishment?' 0 One court has suggested
that "at least where the provision for forfeiture is keyed to the magni-
tude of a defendant's criminal enterprise... the punishment is at least in
some rough way proportional to the crime.""
What are the limits of such "rough" justice? This Note explores
that question, and concludes that "rough" justice is not enough to satisfy
the requirements of the Eighth Amendment. Part I analyzes the RICO
statute: its purposes, the elements of a RICO violation, and the interests
that are subject to forfeiture. Part II examines the history of forfeitures
in America. Part III examines the history, purpose, and scope of the
Eighth Amendment. Part IV proposes and applies an eighth amendment
analytical framework to criminal RICO forfeitures, and examines and
critiques the lower federal courts' treatment of the eighth amendment
issue. Finally, Part V recommends that the statute be amended to com-
port with the Eighth Amendment.
I. The RICO Statute
A. The Statute's Purposes
Congress designed the RICO statute to address the growing prob-
lem of organized crime.' 2 The statute provides for forfeiture in per-
(D. Col. 1985) (suggesting that "the government could seize new buildings legitimately ac-
quired with the insurance proceeds [referred to in Russello] as well as the rents derived from
those buildings.").
10. The Eighth Amendment provides that "excessive bail shall not be required, nor exces-
sive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
11. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980).
12. Congress found that:
[O]rganized crime in the United States is a highly sophisticated, diversified, and
widespread... [influence that controls vast sums of money and power] increasingly
used to infiltrate and corrupt legitimate business and labor unions[,]... to subvert
and corrupt our democratic processes... [and to] weaken the stability of the Na-
tion's economic system.
Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922, 922-23 (1970). For an
exhaustive legislative history of RICO, see Blakey, The RICO Civil Fraud Action in Context:
Reflections on Bennett v. Berg, 58 NOTRE DAME LAW. 237, 249-80 (1982); see also Weiner,
Crime Must Not Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective, 1 N. ILL. U.L. REv. 225, 234-
40 (1981). Congress had, prior to the enactment of RICO, considered the problem of organ-
ized crime, see, e.g., PolIner, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy's Legislative Program to
Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering, 28 BROOKLYN L. REv. 37 (1961) (summarizing the
1961 federal legislation aimed at organized crime), but RICO was the first federal statute pun-
ishing organized crime with forfeiture in personam. See infra note 55 and accompanying text.
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sonam-forfeiture imposed upon the defendant personally- 3 -an
"extraordinary" 14 criminal sanction of "unprecedented scope."' 5 Con-
gress intended that the forfeiture provisions penalize and deter, 6 as well
as enable law enforcement authorities to punish individual criminals and
separate corrupt interstate enterprises from their criminal organiza-
tions.17 Congress intended RICO's forfeiture penalties to do more than
merely provide a "compulsory retirement and promotion system [in or-
ganized crime] as new people step forward to take the place of those
convicted."' 18  The statute's attack on organized crime is thus two-
pronged: first, it removes profits gained from criminal activity; 9 and sec-
ond, through forfeiture of assets involved in criminal activity, it prevents
criminal enterprises from continuing and violators from exercising con-
trol over the enterprise's affairs in absentia, while in jail.2°
B. The Elements of a Criminal RICO Violation
Title 18, section 1962 of the United States Code defines criminal
RICO activity.21 The elements of a criminal RICO offense are:22 (1)
13. S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 191, 193, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 3182, 3376. Traditional forfeiture is in rem, by which the punishment is imposed
against the property. See id.; see also infra notes 56-68 and accompanying text.
14. Hughes & O'Connell, In Personam (Criminal) Forfeiture and Federal Drug Felonies:
An Expansion of a Harsh English Tradition into a Modern Dilemma, 11 PEPPERDINE L. REv.
613, 620 (1984).
15. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983).
16. Id. at 27-28.
17. United States v. Ambrosio, 575 F. Supp. 546, 548 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (citing S. REP.
No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 78 (1969)).
18. Id.
19. United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1347 (D. Col. 1985).
20. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1350 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1005 (1985).
21. Section 1962 provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of
an unlawful debt in which such person has participated as a principal within the
meaning of section 2, title 18, United States Code, to use or invest, directly or indi-
rectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of such income, in acquisition of any
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in,
or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase of securi-
ties on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of
controlling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do
so, shall not be unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by
the purchaser, the members of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in
any pattern of racketeering activity or the collection of an unlawful debt after such
purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one percent of the outstanding securities
of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact, the power to elect one or
more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity
or through collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indi-
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that an enterprise exists;2 3 (2) that the enterprise affects interstate com-
merce; (3) that the defendant was employed by or associated with the
enterprise; (4) that the defendant participated, either directly or indi-
rectly, in the conduct or the affairs of the enterprise; and (5) that the
defendant participated through a pattern of racketeering activity.24
Proof of only a criminal enterprise or a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity does not establish a RICO violation: both must be proven 25 and
shown to be connected or to have some nexus.26 The prosecution must
also prove a connection or nexus between the defendant's conduct and
the property interest the government seeks to have forfeited.27 That
rectly, any interest in or control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activi-
ties of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any en-
terprise engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce,
to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's
affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provi-
sions of subsections (a), (b), or (c) of this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1982).
22. United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1260 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817
(1984); United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289, 1323 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1209 (1983).
23. "Enterprise" is defined as "any individual, partnership, corporation, association, or
other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal
entity." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1982). See generally Tarlow, RICO: The New Darling of the
Prosecutor's Nursery, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 165, 199-208 (1980); Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17
GA. L. REv. 291, 324-46 (1983); Note, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations: Dis-
tinguishing the "Enterprise" Issues, 59 WASH. U.L.Q. 1343 (1982).
24. Racketeering activity includes "any of a wide variety of serious criminal acts under
state and federal law," United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 393 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
445 U.S. 927 (1980), and is defined as "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gam-
bling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matters, or dealing in narcotic or
other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment
for more than one year," or any act indictable under a wide variety of federal statutes. 18
U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A)-(D) (Supp. III 1985). A "pattern of racketeering activity" requires at
least two predicate acts of racketeering. Id. at § 1961(5). To prove a violation of section
1962(d) (conspiracy), the government must additionally establish the existence of an illicit
agreement to violate a substantive RICO provision. United States v. Phillips, 664 F.2d 971,
1012 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 906 (1982).
25. United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1261 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817
(1984); Kimmel v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 476, 495-96 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
26. United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566, 577 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 72
(1985). There is some disagreement as to what constitutes a "nexus" in this context. See
generally Note, The RICO Nexus Requirement: A "Flexible" Linkage, 83 MIcH. L. REv. 571
(1984) (discussing five different tests courts use to define "nexus" in this context, and propos-
ing an alternative).
27. Courts are in closer agreement as to what constitutes a nexus between the defendant's
conduct and the property. See, e.g., Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1348 (forfeiture is allowed if, beyond
a reasonable doubt, there is evidence "linking" the defendant's conduct to the property inter-
est); United States v. Ragonese, 607 F. Supp. 649, 650-51 (S.D. Fla. 1985), aff'd, 784 F.2d 403
(1 lth Cir. 1986) (forfeiture allowed if the property "afforded [the defendant] a source of influ-
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nexus exists when the defendant participates in criminal acts with the
intent that they further the enterprise's affairs, even if the acts relate to
different parts of the enterprise.28
C. Interests Subject to Forfeiture
Section 1963 broadly defines the reach of RICO criminal forfei-
ture.29  Forfeiture is mandatory upon conviction. 30 Forfeiture in per-
ence over the enterprise"). But cf United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566, 577 (1 1th Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 72 (1985) (nexus is established as alleged in the indictment if the jury finds
for forfeiture). The nexus between the property interest and the defendant's conduct is impor-
tant because it provides a safety valve against possible eighth amendment violations. See infra
notes 141-142 and accompanying text.
28. Phillips, 664 F.2d at 1012; Sinito, 723 F.2d at 1261.
29. Title 18, section 1963 of the United States Code provides:
(a) Whoever violates any provision of section 1962 of this chapter [see supra
note 21] shall be fined not more than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both, and shall forfeit to the United States, irrespective of any provision of
State law-
(1) any interest the person has acquired or maintained in violation of sec-
tion 1962;
(2) any-
(A) interest in;
(3) security of;
(C) claim against; or
(D) property or contractual right of any kind affording a source of influ-
ence over; any enterprise which the person has established, operated, con-
trolled, conducted, or participated in the conduct of in violation of section
1962;
(3) any property constituting, or derived from, any proceeds which the
person obtained, directly or indirectly, from racketeering activity or unlawful
debt collection in violation of section 1962. The court, in imposing sentence on
such person shall order, in addition to any other sentence imposed pursuant to
this section, that the person forfeit to the United States all property described in
this subsection. In lieu of a fine otherwise authorized by this section, a defend-
ant who derives profits or other proceeds from an offense may be fined not more
than twice the gross profits or other proceeds.
(b) Property subject to criminal forfeiture under this section includes-
(1) real property, including things growing on, affixed to, and found in
land; and
(2) tangible and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges,
interests, claims and securities.
(c) All right, title, and interest in property described in subsection (a) vests in
the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise to forfeiture under this
section. Any such property that is subsequently transferred to a person other than
the defendant may be the subject of a special verdict of forfeiture and thereafter shall
be ordered forfeited to the United States, unless the transferee establishes in a hearing
pursuant to subsection (m) that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of such property
who at the time of purchase was reasonably without cause to believe that the prop-
erty was subject to forfeiture under this section.
18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)-(c) (Supp. III 1985).
30. Id. at § 1963(a). See also United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 104 (3d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985); United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1349 (5th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1005 (1984); United States v. Godoy, 678 F.2d 84, 88 (9th Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 959 (1984).
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sonam as used in the RICO statute extends to all of a convicted
defendant's interests in the enterprise, regardless whether those assets are
"tainted" by racketeering activity.31 The interests subject to forfeiture
are limited to those set forth in the government's information or indict-
ment.32 The indictment is sufficient if it enumerates the legal associations
or associations-in-fact and alleges that all of a defendant's control and
ownership in each of the enumerated associations is subject to forfei-
ture.33 Thus, a prudent indictment will "cover the waterfront" by alleg-
ing that all of the defendant's interests in specific properties or
enterprises are subject to forfeiture;3 4 the government is under no obliga-
tion to present evidence of the degree to which potentially forfeitable in-
terests are "tainted" by illegal activities.3" The burden to reduce the
potential harshness of a forfeiture verdict rests on the defendant.36
II. Forfeiture in American History
Forfeiture37 as a sanction or penalty can be divided into two catego-
ries: (1) forfeiture in personam, a criminal proceeding, or (2) forfeiture
in rem, a civil proceeding.3" Forfeitures in personam operate against the
guilty person, and can be imposed only after the defendant has been
found guilty.39 Forfeitures in rem operate against a specific res" that has
been used for an unlawful purpose, and, being civil in nature, operate
without regard to the culpability of its owner.41
31. Cauble, 706 F.2d at 1349.
32. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(2).
33. United States v. Boffa, 688 F.2d 919, 939 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1066
(1984); United States v. Grammatikos, 633 F.2d 1013, 1024 (2d Cir. 19S0).
34. Such an indictment satisfies the requirements of Rule 7(c)(2) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. See infra note 55.
35. United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 857 (2d Cir.), cerL denied. 464 U.S. 825 (1983).
This, however, is entirely consonant with the conceptual underpinnings of forfeiture in per-
sonam: it is a punishment imposed directly upon the person; the defendant, rather than the
property, is adjudged guilty. See infra notes 37-41 and accompanying text.
36. Walsh, 700 F.2d at 857.
37. Forfeitures did not originate in American history. Forfeiture provisions in English
law can be traced as far back as the late seventh century. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE
HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 442-62 (1929); 2 F. POLLACK & F. MAITLAND, THE HIS-
TORY OF ENGLISH LAW 462-511 (2d ed. 1898 & photo. reprint 1968); see also Note, Bane of
American Forfeiture Law-Banished at Last?, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 768, 770 n.15 (1977)
[hereinafter Note, American Forfeiture Law]. For a review of forfeiture in English common
law, see id. at 770-76.
38. See H.R. REP. No. 1030, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 193-197, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 3182, 3376-80. "[T]he proceeding in rem stands independent of, and
wholly unaffected by any criminal proceeding in personam." The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827). See generally Hughes & O'Connell, supra note 14, at 617-18.
39. H.R. REP. No. 1030, supra note 38, at 3376-77.
40. "[A] thing; an object." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1172 (5th ed. 1979).
41. Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-81 (1974). See also
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. at 14-15 (forfeiture in rem does not require a finding that the owner is
RICO FORFEITURES
A. Forfeiture In Personam
Forfeiture in personam in American law has its historical roots in
the English common law, and dates back nearly 1300 years.42 At Eng-
lish common law a felony conviction automatically escheated43 all of the
defendant's realty to his lord and forfeited all personalty to the Crown,
and a convicted traitor forfeited both to the Crown.' Such forfeitures
were justified on the theory that all land and property were thought ulti-
mately to be held by the Crown as part of the bond of allegiance between
the King and society,4' and that a breach of the criminal law was an
offense against the King's peace-justifying denial of the right to own
property.46 In addition, conviction of a felony resulted in the "corrup-
tion" of the defendant's blood, depriving the defendant's ancestors and
heirs of certain property rights.47 A felon who had broken the social
contract no longer had any right to social advantages, including transfer
of property, and people believed that punishing the felon as well as his
ancestors and heirs would serve as a more effective deterrent than would
personal punishment alone.48
The concept of common-law forfeiture crossed the Atlantic with the
colonists.49 Forfeiture law varied substantially from colony to colony,50
but did not long survive in the new republic. The colonists and the
guilty). The language of a statute can be indicative of whether its forfeiture provisions are in
personam or in rem. See Comment, RICO Forfeitures and the Rights of Innocent Third Par-
ties, 18 CAL. W.L. REv. 345, 350 n.62 (1982) (RICO statute is set forth in terms of violations
committed by defendants; forfeiture in rem statutes are couched in terms of property, e.g.,
"property used in the commission of a violation .... "),
42. See Note, American Forfeiture Law, supra note 37, at 770 n.15.
43. Escheat is an obstruction in the normal course of the descent of property whereby the
property reverts to the original grantor. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 488 (5th ed. 1979).
44. 3 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 68-71 (5th ed. 1942); 1 F. POLLACK
& F. MAITLAND, supra note 37, at 351. A felony at early English common law was defined as
a crime punished by forfeiture. Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487, 499 (1885).
45. See 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
177-79 (4th ed. 1873).
46. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *299.
47. See 1 J. BISHOP, COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 583-84 (8th ed. 1892); 2 J.
KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW *385-87.
Corruption of blood was the English law concept, noW abandoned, that the blood of the
convicted person was corrupted and therefore that person could neither inherit lands or other
hereditaments from his ancestor, nor retain those he already had, nor transmit them by de-
scent to any heir. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 311 (5th ed. 1979). See also infra note 52 and
accompanying text.
48. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at 381-83.
49. Adoption of the English common law in the colonies was not automatic; their crimi-
nal law depended upon local adoption, except as Parliament specifically directed. See Smith,
The English Criminal Law in Early American History, in J. SMITH & T. BARNES, THE ENG-
LISH LEGAL SYSTEM: CARRYOVER TO THE COLONIES 16-21, 41 (1975); see generally I 3.
BISHOP, supra note 47, at 585-86.
50. See Note, American Forfeiture Law, supra note 37, at 776-77.
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Framers particularly disfavored forfeiture as a consequence of criminal
conviction.51 The Constitution forbids corruption of blood and the for-
feiture of a traitor's estate, except during the life of the person at-
tainted.52 It also forbids bills of attainder of any kind. 3 The first
Congress abolished forfeiture of estate and corruption of blood for felo-
nies. 4 Forfeiture in personam was thus almost completely absent from
American law until RICO's enactment in 1971.11
51. Cf. 2 J. KENT, supra note 47, at 385-87 ("tendency of public opinion has been to
condemn forfeiture of property; at least in the cases of felony .... ; several states abolished
forfeiture).
52. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
53. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. A bill of attainder is a special legislative act that inflicts
capital punishment upon a person allegedly guilty of high offenses, such as treason and felony,
without trial or conviction according to the recognized rules of procedure. 2 J. STORY, supra
note 45, at 209-10. If such a legislative act inflicts a milder degree of punishment, it is called a
bill of pains and penalties. Id. The phrase "bill of attainder" as used in the Constitution
includes bills of pain and penalties as well as the traditional bills of attainder. Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1866).
54. Act of April 30, 1790, 1 Stat. 112, 117, ch. 9, § 24 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 3563
(Supp. III 1985)). The Act expired on November 1, 1986. Many states also have constitu-
tional or statutory prohibitions similar to the 1790 Act. See Hughes & O'Connell, supra note
14, at 619 n.38 (listing numerous state constitutions prohibiting forfeiture of estate); see also 2
J. KENT, supra note 47, at 386.
According to then-Deputy Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, the enactment in 1970
of section 1963(a) constituted by implication a partial repeal of 18 U.S.C. § 3563. S. REP. No.
617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80 (1969). This view has been criticized as being "without legal
or historical support." United States v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 830 (1980). The Grande court felt that the 1970 statute was directed at total disinher-
itance and forfeiture of all of one's property and estate, and that RICO's more limited forfei-
ture provisions thus did not fall within the prohibitions. Id. at 1038-39. See also United States
v. Tynen, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 88, 92-93 (1870) (to constitute an implied repeal, the later-enacted
statute must cover the entire field occupied by the earlier one).
55. S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 80 (1969). The single federal exception was the
Confiscation Act of 1862, ch. 195, § 5, 12 Stat. 589, enacted "to suppress Insurrection, to
punish Treason and Rebellion, [and] to seize and confiscate the Property of rebels ... ." Id. at
590. The Act authorized the President to forfeit the life estates of Confederate soldiers, politi-
cians, or sympathizers. Id. The Act was upheld by the Supreme Court in Bigelow v. Forrest,
76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339 (1869), and Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1870). The
author has been unable to find any reported state criminal forfeiture proceedings prior to
RICO. Accord, Note, American Forfeiture Law, supra note 37, at 778 n.15; see also Hughes &
O'Connell, supra note 14, at 619 n.38 (listing numerous state constitutions prohibiting forfei-
ture of estate).
The introduction of RICO's forfeiture in personam required that Congress amend some of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in order to provide procedures for RICO's criminal
forfeiture provisions. FED. R. CRIM. P. 31 advisory committee note (1972). For example, Rule
7(c)(2) presently provides that "[n]o judgment of forfeiture may be entered in a criminal pro-
ceeding unless the indictment or the information shall allege the extent of the interest or prop-
erty subject to forfeiture." Id. at Rule 7(c)(2). However, the Rule requires only that the
indictment describe the interests or property that may be subject to forfeiture; there is no
requirement that the government be correct in its assertion that the interests are subject to
[Vol. 14:451
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B. Forfeiture In Rem
Forfeiture in rem does not require that a defendant be guilty;56
rather, the property (or res) is determined to be "guilty." 57 The concept
of forfeiture in rem can be traced back to the Bible: "If an ox gore a man
or woman, and they die, he shall be stoned; and his flesh shall not be
eaten.""8 In English law, forfeiture in rem was often enforced in the
Court of Exchequer59 and in the admiralty courts.6 Unlike forfeiture in
personam, forfeiture in rem was not viewed so dispropitiously in early
American history. "Long before the adoption of the constitution the
common law courts of the colonies-and later the states during the pe-
riod of Confederation-were exercising jurisdiction in rem in the en-
forcement of forfeiture statutes."62 Forfeiture in rem later appeared in
the American Navigation Acts.63 Today, numerous examples of forfei-
ture in rem abound.'
In United States v. Brig Malek Adhel, 65 the United States Supreme
forfeiture. United States v. Meyers, 432 F. Supp. 456, 461 (W.D. Pa. 1977) (citing United
States v. Hall, 521 F.2d 406, 407-08 (9th Cir. 1975)).
Rule 31(e) was amended in 1972 to provide that "[i]f the indictment or the information
alleges that an interest or property is subject to criminal forfeiture, a special verdict shall be
returned as to the extent of the interest or property subject to forfeiture, if any." FED. R.
CRIM. P. 31(e). However, parties waive their right to a special verdict by failing to make a
timely request. United States v. Zang, 703 F.2d 1186, 1193-95 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 828 (1983). In the absence of such a request a general verdict will suffice. Id. at
1194-95.
56. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
57. "The thing [in a forfeiture in rem proceeding] is here primarily considered as the
offender, or rather the offense is attached primarily to the thing; and this, whether the offense
be malum prohibitum, or malum in se." The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827).
The terminology in this area of the law-deeming property "guilty"--can be misleading.
Even though the property in a proceeding in rem is "guilty," the forfeiture takes place within a
civil, not criminal, proceeding. See 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3376.
58. Exodus 21:28. The ox was considered to be forfeited to God for its offense against
Him. See Finkelstein, The Goring Ox: Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures,
Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of Forfeiture, 46 TEMPLE L.Q. 169, 180-81 (1973).
59. 3 W. BLACKSTONE, supra note 46, at 261-62.
60. C.J. Hendry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 137 (1943).
61. See 2 J. BOUVIER, INSTITUTES OF AMERICAN LAW 147 (Philadelphia 1854); see also
The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827) (upholding the use of forfeiture in rem).
62. C.J Hendry Co., 318 U.S. at 139.
63. See Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 12, 36, 1 Stat. 29, 39, 47-48.
64. See, e.g., Hughes & O'Connell, supra note 14, at 618 n.30 (collecting numerous federal
forfeiture in rem statutes). For further discussion of forfeiture in rem, see Reed & Gill, RICO
Forfeitures, Forfeitable "Interests," and Procedural Due Process, 62 N.C.L. REv. 57, 62-66
(1983).
65. 43 U.S. (2 How.) 209 (1844). Brig Malek Adhel involved the forfeiture of an armed
merchantman whose captain, shortly after the voyage began, became mentally unbalanced and
fired on several ships that crossed the brig's course. The owner was innocent of any wrongdo-
ing. Nevertheless, the Court upheld the forfeiture of the ship "without any reference whatso-
ever to the character or conduct of the owner." Id. See also 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
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Court established the personification fiction used today66 to justify forfei-
ture in rem.67 "Personification" is a legal fiction "ascribing to the prop-
erty a certain personality, a power of complicity and guilt in the
wrong."68 Once the property is determined to be guilty, it is "punished"
by forfeiture.
III. The Eighth Amendment
The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be re-
quired, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments
inflicted."'69 The Supreme Court has consistently held that the Eighth
Amendment "was designed to protect [only] those [persons] convicted of
crimes."" Criminal RICO forfeitures are in personam-imposed against
the guilty person-and are thus a punishment subject to the Eighth
Amendment. If the forfeitures were in rem-imposed against the prop-
erty in a civil proceeding- the Eighth Amendment would not apply.7'
To date, the Supreme Court has not applied the Eighth Amendment to
the RICO statute's criminal forfeiture provisions. 2
A. Origins of the Eighth Amendment
The phrase "cruel and unusual punishment" has its origins in the
English Bill of Rights of 1689, 7" which provided "excessive Baile ought
not be required nor excessive Fines imposed nor cruell and unusuall Pun-
NEws 3376 n. 12 (generally the guilt or innocence of the owner of the asset is irrelevant, but
some more recently enacted forfeiture statutes provide that property of an innocent owner
cannot be forfeited). The Court justified treating the ship as the guilty thing or instrument to
which the forfeiture attached on "the necessity of the case, as the only adequate means of
suppressing the offense or wrong, or insuring indemnity to the injured party." Brig Malek
Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 233.
66. See, e.g., Goldsmith-Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505 (1921).
67. Brig Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) at 212-19.
68. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 510. The fiction is a curious one, for "goods cannot
offend, forfeit, unlade, pay duties, or the like, but men whose goods they are [can]." Boyd v.
United States, 116 U.S. 616, 637 (1886). However, it is nevertheless a fiction "firmly fixed" in
American jurisprudence. Goldsmith-Grant, 254 U.S. at 511.
69. U.S. CONsT. amend. VIII.
70. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664 (1977). See also infra notes 81-85 and accom-
panying text. Further, the Amendment does not apply to the government's treatment of a
defendant prior to an adjudication of the defendant's guilt. Revere v. Massachusetts Gen.
Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983).
71. This is because the Eighth Amendment applies only to criminal sanctions. See infra
notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
72. The RICO statute was passed in 1970. See supra note 1 and accompanying text. The
idea that the Eighth Amendment limits criminal RICO forfeitures was judicially proposed
relatively recently, in United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445
U.S. 927 (1980).
73. Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 664.
ishments inflicted."74 There are two interpretations of the English use of
the phrase. The first is that it was a reaction to the conduct of Lord
Chief Justice Jeffreys and the barbarous forms of punishment he imposed
during the treason trials in 1685. 71 The second interpretation, based on
the legislative history of the English Bill of Rights and the seventeenth
century meaning of the word "cruel," is that the phrase was directed at
the punishments imposed upon Titus Oates for his perjury in connection
with the infamous "Popish Plot" of 1678-79.76 The historian propound-
ing the latter interpretation concluded the phrase was an objection to the
imposition of punishments unauthorized by statute and outside the juris-
diction of the sentencing court, and was a reiteration of the English pol-
icy against disproportionate penalties. 7
Regardless which interpretation is more accurate, the colonists bor-
rowed the phrase and it first appeared in America on June 12, 1776, in
Virginia's "Declaration of Rights."' 78 The federal government inserted
the phrase into the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and in 1791 it became
the Eighth Amendment.79
74. 1 Wm. & Mary, Sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). The principle underlying the prohibition can be
traced in English law to as early as 1042 in the laws of Edward the Confessor. See Commen-
tary, Constitutional Law. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Provision of Eighth Amendment as
Restriction Upon State Action Through the Due Process Clause, 34 MINN. L. REV. 134, 135
(1950). "Illegal" punishments were prohibited in what eventually became the English Bill of
Rights of 1689, but the final draft referred to "cruel and unusual" punishments. The legisla-
tive history of the English Bill of Rights offers no insight as to how the phrase is to be inter-
preted, and the inclusion of the word "unusual" has been attributed to inadvertence, Furman
v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 318 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring), and to "chance and sloppy
draftsmanship." Granucci, "Nor Cruel and Unusual Punishments Inflicted" The Original
Meaning, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 839, 855 (1969).
75. See I. BRANDT, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 155 (1965); 2 J. STORY, supra note 45, at 623-
24. On Lord Chief Justice Jeffrey's conduct at the trials, see H. IRVING, THE LIFE OF JUDGE
JEFFREYS 258-308 (1898).
76. See Granucci, supra note 74, at 852-60. The "Popish Plot" refers to the proclamation
in 1678 by Titus Oates, a minister in the Church of England, of the existence of a plot to
assassinate Charles II. Fifteen Catholics were executed in the hysteria that followed. Oates's
perjury was eventually disclosed and he was sentenced to (1) a fine of 2,000 marks; (2) life
imprisonment; (3) whippings; (4) pilloring; and (5) defrocking. A minority of the House of
Lords dissented from the rejection of Oates's petition for release from the judgment, primarily
on the grounds that the King's Bench, a temporal court, had no power to defrock Oates and
that there was no precedent for the other punishments imposed, given that the crime was
perjury. See id. at 858.
77. Id. at 860.
78. Cf I B. SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 231-35
(1971). The phrase, however, was slightly different from what ultimately became the Eighth
Amendment. Virginia's phrase read: "That excessive ball ought not be required, nor excessive
fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." Id. at 278. Other states also
adopted similar provisions. See generally R. RUTLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
1776-1791 (1955).
79. Granucci, supra note 74, at 840. Congressional debate on the Eighth Amendment
sheds little light on its meaning. The debate was minimal:
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B. Judicial Interpretation of "Cruel and Unusual Punishment"
Most of the current understanding of the scope of the Eighth
Amendment has come from Supreme Court opinions. Although the leg-
islative history of the Amendment is sparse,8" the Court has over the last
century fleshed out the principles contained in the phrase. These princi-
ples, which derive from the holdings and the language of the Court's
opinions, are discussed below.
1. The Sanction Must Be Criminal
The Eighth Amendment applies only to criminal sanctions; it has no
application outside the criminal process. The Court revealed the strict-
ness of this requirement in Ingraham v. Wright. 8 1 Ingraham concerned a
Florida statute that authorized corporal punishment provided the
Mr. Smith, of South Carolina, objected to the words "nor cruel and unusual
punishments;" the import of them being too indefinite.
Mr. Livermore: The clause seems to express a great deal of humanity, on which
account I have no objection to it; but as it seems to have no meaning in it, I do not
think it necessary .... No cruel and unusual punishment is to be inflicted; it is some-
times necessary to hang a man, villains often deserve whipping, and perhaps having
their ears cut off; but are we in future to be prevented from inflicting these punish-
ments because they are cruel? If a more lenient mode of correcting Nice and deterring
others from the commission of it could be invented, it would be very prudent in the
Legislature to adopt it; but until we have some security that this will be done, we
ought not to be restrained from making necessary laws by any declaration of this
kind.
I ANNALS OF CONG. 754 (J. Gales ed. 1789).
It is thus unclear precisely what the Framers intended the clause to mean. Perhaps the
Framers' intent is indiscernible and thus irrelevant to modern interpretations of the phrase.
Cf Granucci, supra note 74, at 840-41 n.8:
The history of the writing of the first American bills of rights and constitutions
simply does not bear out the presupposition that the process was a diligent or system-
atic one. Those documents, which we uncritically exalt, were imitative, deficient, and
irrationally selective. In the glorious act of framing a social compact expressive of
the supreme law, Americans tended simply to draw up a random catalogue of rights
that seemed to satisfy their urge for a statement of first principles-or for some of
them. That task was executed in a disordered fashion that verged on ineptness.
(citations omitted).
Whatever their intent, it is clear that the meaning of the phrase has over time evolved
beyond that given by the Framers. See, ag., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976) (citing
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)) (the Amendment is flexible and "must be
capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth"), see also Tribe, Seven
Deadly Sins of Straining the Constitution Through a Pseudo-Scientific Sieve, 36 HASTINGS L.J.
155, 168 (1984) (the Founders, through their unexpressed intentions, should not rule from
their graves on modern constitutional interpretation). But cf. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428
U.S. 280, 308 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("[I]t is by no means clear that the prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishments embodied in the Eighth Amendment... was not lim-
ited to those punishments deemed cruel and unusual at the time of the adoption of the Bill of
Rights.").
80. See supra note 79. In any event, the Framers' intent should not be relevant to the
scope of the phrase today. Tribe, supra note 79, at 168.
81. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
RICO FORFEITURES
teacher had consulted with the principal or teacher in charge of the
school and the punishment was not "degrading or unduly severe." 2 The
school board regulations authorized the paddling of recalcitrant students'
buttocks with a flat wooden paddle. The evidence showed that the pun-
ishments were "exceptionally harsh."83 For example, on one occasion a
student was subjected to twenty paddle blows while being held over a
table; the student suffered a hematoma that required medical attention
and kept him out of school for several days. Another student was struck
so hard on his arm that he lost the full use of it for a week.
The Court was unmoved by these compelling facts. The majority
held that the history and judicial interpretation of the Eighth Amend-
ment showed that it "was designed to protect [only] those convicted of
crimes. We adhere to this longstanding limitation and hold that the
Eighth Amendment does not apply to the paddling of children as a
means of maintaining discipline in public schools."84
The majority's analysis demonstrates that if a punishment is not a
criminal sanction, it is not "punishment" within the meaning of the
Eighth Amendment." Only after the sanction is deemed a criminal
"punishment" will the question whether it is "cruel and unusual" be
reached.
2. Legislative Power to Impose the Sanction
The legislature must have the power both (1) to make criminal the
proscribed conduct, and (2) to impose that form of punishment. If the
legislature does not have such power, that punishment is proscribed by
the Eighth Amendment. The Court illustrated the first principle in
Robinson v. California.86 The defendant was convicted under a Califor-
nia statute making it a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment, to be
82. Id. at 655.
83. Id. at 657. Justice White noted in dissent that "the record reveals beatings so severe
that if they were inflicted on a hardened criminal for the commission of a serious crime, they
might not pass constitutional muster." IM. at 684-85 (White, J., dissenting).
84. 430 U.S. at 664.
85. Justice White, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, dissented
vigorously:
[T]he constitutional prohibition is against cruel and unusualpunishments nowhere is
that prohibition limited or modified by the language of the Constitution. Certainly,
the fact that the Framers did not choose to insert the word "criminal" into the lan-
guage of the Eighth Amendment is strong evidence that the Amendment was
designed to prohibit all inhumane or barbaric punishments, no matter what the na-
ture of the offense for which the punishment is imposed.
Id. at 685 (White, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). See also Rosenberg, Ingraham v.
Wright: The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. Rv. 75, 76-89 (1978) (neither
precedent, history, nor policy suggests that the Eighth Amendment should be limited to crimi-
nal punishments).
86. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
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"addicted to the use of narcotics.""7 The Court struck down the punish-
ment, holding that:
In the light of contemporary human knowledge, a law which made
a criminal offense of such a disease [insanity, for example,] would
doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments....
We cannot but consider the statute before us as of the same
category.88
The Court illustrated the second principle, that the legislature have
the power to impose that form of punishment, in Trop v. Dulles.89 Trop's
application for a passport had been denied on the ground that under a
federal statute he had lost his citizenship because of his dishonorable dis-
charge for desertion of the army.9° He sought a declaratory judgment
that he was a citizen, but the Second Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of the government's motion for summary judgment.91 The
Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Eighth Amendment acts as a
substantive limitation on legislative discretion as to the form and magni-
tude of a sanction:
[U]se of denationalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth
Amendment. There may be involved no physical mistreatment, no
primitive torture. There is instead the total destruction of the in-
dividual's status in organized society. It is a form of punishment
more primitive than torture, for it destroys for the individual the
political existence that was centuries in the development. 92
87. The statute provided: "No person shall use, or be under the influence of, or be ad-
dicted to the use of narcotics, excepting when administered by or under the direction of a
person licensed by the State to prescribe and administer narcotics." Act of June 13, 1957, ch.
1064, § 1, 1957 Cal. Stat. 2343. The 1963 California Legislature deleted the clause "or be
addicted to the use of." Act of June 13, 1963, ch. 913, § 1, 1963 Cal. Stat. 2162. In 1972, the
California Legislature reorganized the relevant codes; the current version of the statute can be
found in CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11550 (West Supp. 1987).
88. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666-67.
89. 356 U.S 86 (1958) (plurality opinion). Chief Justice Warren authored the judgment of
the Court and was joined by Justices Black, Douglas, and Whittaker.
90. The statute was then-section 401(g) of the Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-
853, 54 Stat. 1137, 1168-69, 8 U.S.C. § 1481(a)(8) (1958). The dishonorable discharge arose as
follows: Trop, a native born citizen of the United States, was a private in the United States
Army and was serving in French Morocco. He escaped from the stockade at Casablanca,
where he had been confined following a previous breach of discipline. After being gone less
than a day he surrendered to an officer on an army truck while he was walking back towards
his base. He was subsequently court-martialed and dishonorably discharged. 356 U.S. at 87-
88.
91. Trop v. Dulles, 239 F.2d 527 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
92. 356 U.S. at 101-04. Justice Brennan concurred, concluding that the punishment ex-
ceeded Congress' legislative powers. Id. at 114 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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3. Novel Methods of Punishment
Trop v. Dulles demonstrated that nontraditional methods of punish-
ment are subject to more searching eighth amendment scrutiny than
traditional methods of punishment:93 "Fines, imprisonment and even ex-
ecution may be imposed depending upon the enormity of the crime, but
any technique outside the bounds of these traditional penalties is consti-
tutionally suspect." 94 As Professor Tribe has noted, "[a]s a further crite-
rion of offense [against the Eighth Amendment], the element of novelty
provides useful guidance, for lack of routine use in a broad range of situa-
tions deprives us of confidence that a technique [of punishment] repre-
sents no great affront to human dignity."9 Further, Professor Wheeler
has noted:
If... administrators are permitted to create new punishments and
modify statutory ones, many different punishments will exist, and
incommensurability will result. As Bentham observed, it is virtu-
ally impossible to judge the relative severity of different amounts of
different punishments. The more punishments we employ, there-
fore, the more certain we can be that some significant dispropor-
tionality will result and go undetected. 9
6
Trop v. Dulles also indicates that nontraditional methods of punish-
ment may come within the express prohibitions of the Eighth Amend-
ment. As Chief Justice Warren wrote:
On the few occasions this Court has had to consider the meaning
of the [Eighth Amendment], precise distinctions between cruelty
and unusualness do not seem to have been drawn.... [However, if]
the word "unusual" is to have any meaning apart from the word
"cruel," . . . the meaning should be the ordinary one, signifying
something different from that which is generally done.9 7
Moreover, since forfeiture in personam was disfavored in early
American law,98 perhaps the Framers intended to include such forfeiture
within the constitutional proscription against "cruel and unusual punish-
ment." Although not dispositive, such an intent on the part of the Fram-
ers is additional evidence that novel punishments are inherently
constitutionally suspect.
93. In other words, Trop illustrated that nontraditional methods of punishment have a
weaker presumption of constitutionality than that generally accorded to statutes. Generally,
statutes are presumptively constitutional. See, ag., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985).
94. 356 U.S. at 100. But cf In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (punishment can be
constitutional even though unusual).
95. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTTUTIONAL LAW 917 (1978) (footnote omitted).
96. Wheeler, Toward a Theory of Limited Punishment: An Examination of the Eighth
Amendment, 24 STAN. L. REv. 838, 855-56 (1972) (footnote omitted).
97. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100 n.32.
98. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
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4. Legislative Purpose
The Eighth Amendment requires that the legislature have a humane
purpose in prescribing the criminal penalty. This principle underlies the
decisions in In re Kemmler99 and Louisiana ex rel. Francis v.
Resweber. " Both cases involved the use of electrocution as a method of
punishment. In Kemmler, an eighth amendment challenge was made to
a statute authorizing electrocution as a method of punishment. The
Court upheld the statute, reasoning that the "act was passed in the effort
to devise a more humane method of reaching the result," 10 1 and was
therefore permissible.102
In Louisiana e~c rel. Francis v. Resweber, the defendant was sen-
tenced to death by electrocution but the initial attempt to do so failed
because of a mechanical error in the electric chair. He appealed the
state's second attempt to electrocute him, claiming the psychological
preparation for a second electrocution was a "lingering or cruel and unu-
sual punishment." 103 The Court rejected his claim, holding:
The fact that an unforeseeable accident prevented the prompt con-
summation of the sentence cannot, it seems to us, add an element
of cruelty to a subsequent execution. There is no purpose to inflict
unnecessary pain nor [is] any unnecessary pain involved in the pro-
posed execution. The situation of the unfortunate victim of this
accident is just as though he had suffered the identical amount of
mental anguish and physical pain in any other occurrence, such as,
for example, a fire in the cell block. We cannot agree that the
hardship imposed upon the petitioner rises to that level of hardship
denounced as [cruel and unusual]. 1
5. Frequency of Imposition
The Eighth Amendment proscribes the infrequent imposition of
criminal sanctions. This principle was dramatically illustrated in
Furman v. Georgia, 105 in which the Court examined the imposition of the
99. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).,
100. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
101. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447. The statute was passed because the state legislature felt
electrocution to be more "humane and practical" than hanging. Id. at 444. The Eighth
Amendment had not yet been held to apply to the states by reason of the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, however "it is very apparent that the nature of the punish-
ment involved was examined under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,"
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 323 (1972) (Marshall, J., concurring), through which the
Eighth Amendment now applies to the States. See, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660,
667 (1962).
102. The Court also rejected the idea that capital punishment was cruel and unusual.
Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 447.
103. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464.
104. Id.
105. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
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death penalty in three cases-one murder conviction and two rape con-
victions. In each case a state statute left to the discretion of the judge or
jury the determination whether the penalty should be death or a lighter
punishment. All three defendants were black, and all three victims were
white.
The Court, in a per curiam opinion, held that "the imposition and
carrying out of the death penalty in [these cases] constitute[s] cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments."1" 6
Each Justice filed a separate opinion."0 7 But Justices Douglas, Bren-
nan, Stewart, and White each developed in a separate concurring opinion
the notion that the Eighth Amendment proscribes punishment of a crim-
inal defendant if large numbers of other, equally culpable and convicted
defendants are not similarly punished.10 8
Such logic yields an anomalous result: courts may not constitution-
ally punish only some criminal defendants of similar guilt, but courts
may constitutionally punish those same defendants if most of the same
class of defendants are similarly punished. The punishment of additional
defendants thus has the curious effect of legitimizing the punishment of a
smaller percentage of similarly situated defendants. But the anomaly
points out the problem: if one defendant is punished while a large
number of similarly situated defendants receive a less severe punishment,
then (1) there is no equality of punishment;0 9 (2) infliction of the punish-
ment is arbitrary and unusual; "0 and (3) by reason of its infrequency,
the infliction of the punishment does not serve the societal need for retri-
bution, does not provide a credible threat so as to be effective as a deter-
rent, and does not provide any discernible social or public purpose."'
For these reasons, a punishment must not be imposed randomly or
infrequently.
A related but distinct principle is that there must be a meaningful
basis for distinguishing those cases in which the penalty is imposed from
those in which it is not.'12 Without a meaningful basis for such a distinc-
tion, the same objections that condemn infrequent imposition of the pun-
ishment condemn disparate treatment of two similar cases. For example,
106. Id. at 239-40.
107. A 5-4 majority struck down the various laws. The nine opinions total 230 pages. Id.
at 240-470.
108. Id. at 249-55 (Douglas, I., concurring); id. at 291-93 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at
309 (Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 311-13 (White, J., concurring).
109. Id. at 255 (Douglas, J., concurring).
110. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
111. Id. at 311-12 (White, J., concurring).
112. Cf id. at 313; id. at 274 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("the State does not respect human
dignity when, without reason, it inflicts upon some people a severe punishment that it does not
inflict upon others").
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as between two equally culpable, similarly situtated co-conspirators, dis-
parate punishment is inequitable and arbitrary; it does not, with respect
to the less severe penalty, serve the public need for retribution; it is an
ineffective deterrent because imposition of a harsh penalty is seen as es-
sentially the luck of the draw; and it undercuts public confidence in the
impartiality of the legal system.
6. Proportionality
The Eighth Amendment requires that a punishment be proportion-
ate to the crime. The principle of proportionality has strong roots in the
common law. The Magna Carta contained several paragraphs devoted to
the principle. 13 The English Bill of Rights, upon which the Eighth
Amendment is based, repeated the principle. 114 Further, proportionality
is the central principle of the Eighth Amendment as developed in the
Supreme Court.1
15
Proportionality protects several important values. First, it protects
against the state's abuse of its power to punish the defendant. Although
the state has the right to punish, 116 that right extends only as far as is
justified by the seriousness of the defendant's crime.117 Further punish-
ment by the state is therefore a wrong against the defendant. Second, it
affirms the dignity of the criminal defendant. Since "an autonomous per-
son has the right that his punishment be addressed to... those unique
113. J. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 322 (1965).
114. 1 Wm. & Mary, Sess. 2, ch. 2 (1689). See supra text accompanying note 74.
115. See, eg., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 285-86 (1983); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782 (1982); Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 & n.3 (1982) (per curiam); Hutto v. Finney, 437
U.S. 678, 685 (1978); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977); Ingraham v. Wright, 430
U.S. 651, 657 (1977); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)
(plurality opinion); Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367 (1910); O'Neil v. Vermont, 144
U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting). But see Solem, 463 U.S. at 311 n.3 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting) ("the Cruel and Unusual Punishments clause might apply to those rare cases
where reasonable men cannot differ as to the inappropriateness of a punishment. In all other
cases, [the Court] should defer to the legislature's line-drawing.").
Proportionality analysis "should be guided by objective criteria, including (i) the gravity
of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in
the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in
other jurisdictions." Solem, 463 U.S. at 292. However, since the Amendment is flexible and
"must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth," Weems, 217 U.S.
at 373, the objective criteria should not ossify: as a society becomes more "enlightened by a
humane justice," id. at 378, the process and result of the objective inquiry should be similarly
enlightened. The proportionality analysis in this Note therefore differs from that used in
Solem.
116. Trop, 356 U.S. at 100.
117. Cf Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 800 (1982) ("American criminal law has long
considered a defendant's ... moral guilty ... to be critical to the degree of [his] criminal
culpability.' ") (citation omitted); see also H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILrY
231 (1982).
features of his individual, responsible conduct which occasioned the pun-
ishment,"'1I a defendant punished out of proportion to the seriousness of
his offense is being used-treated as nonhuman-when the punishment is
addressed to something other than the defendant's blameworthiness." 9
Third, proportionality helps preserve the general deterrent effect of pun-
ishment. Disproportionate punishments encourage the commission of
more serious crimes, because the criminal risks nothing by committing a
more serious crime.120 Proportionality thus serves to deter the commis-
sion of more serious crimes.
Z Human Dignity
Closely related to the principle of proportionality is the idea, first
articulated in Trop v. Dulles, that "[t]he basic concept underlying the
Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man. . . . The
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of de-
cency that mark the progress of a maturing society,"' 21 which must be
evaluated "in the light of contemporary human knowledge."'1 22
By including the concept of human dignity within the constitutional
protections of the Eighth Amendment, the Court preserves several im-
portant values. First, the principle protects convicted criminals from
punishments with effects that are too harsh. For example, the Court in
Trop v. Dulles struck down the use of denationalization as a punishment.
The effects of the punishment were simply too severe:
[The punishment] destroys for the individual the political existence
that was centuries in the development. The punishment strips the
citizen of his status in the national and international political com-
munity. His very existence is at the sufferance of the country in
which he happens to find himself.... It subjects the individual to a
fate of ever-increasing fear and distress. He knows not what dis-
criminations may be established against him .... and for what
cause his existence in his native land may be terminated. He may
be subject to banishment, a fate universally decried by civilized
people. He is stateless, a condition deplored in the international
118. J. MURPHY, RETRIBUTION, JUSTICE, AND THERAPY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
OF LAW 234 (1979).
119. Id. See also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272-73 (Brennan, J., concurring) (pun-
ishments are condemned when "they treat members of the human race as nonhumans, as
objects to be toyed with and discarded").
120. Cf Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments, in THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 127 (S.
Grupp. ed. 1971) ("The severity of the punishment of itself emboldens men to commit the
very wrongs it is supposed to prevent; they are driven to commit additional crimes to avoid the
punishment for the single one."); see also 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3229
("sentences that are disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense create a disrespect for
the law").
121. 356 U.S. at 101. See also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976); Gregg v. Geor-
gia, 428 U.S. 153, 173, 182 (1976).
122. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
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communities.' 2
3
Second, by forcing the government to treat the convicted defendant
as an individual rather than merely as the object of punishment, and by
requiring the government to justify the punishment, convicted criminals
are protected from punishments that do not measurably contribute to-
wards the punishment's goal.124 For example, the principle protects a
criminal from the gratuitous infliction of punishment, because that does
not measurably contribute towards the goal of punishment.
Third, inclusion of the concept of human dignity reaffirms that we
are "a government of laws and not men," ' 5 and that the Constitution
sets limits beyond which the legislature may not proceed.
IV. The Eighth Amendment and Criminal RICO Forfeitures
A. The Analytical Framework
Courts that have applied the Eighth Amendment to RICO criminal
forfeitures have not used a consistent analytical framework; rather, the
courts have considered the issue on a case-by-case basis. 26 The dangers
of a case-by-case approach are twofold. First, in the absence of a consist-
ently applied model, the eighth amendment analysis becomes so fact spe-
cific that it provides little useful precedential guidance, and results in
outcomes that turn on subtle factual distinctions that are impossible to
defend rationally. 127 The second, more insidious danger is that as the
body of case law finding no eighth amendment violation grows, it be-
comes easier for a court to analogize the facts of the case before it to a
123. 356 U.S. at 101-02.
124. Cf. Furman, 408 U.S. at 312 (White, J., concurring) (punishment with negligible so-
cial or public purposes is "patently excessive cruel and unusual punishment violative of the
Eighth Amendment"); see also id. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("The State, even as it
punishes, must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings.").
125. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
126. The lower courts that have considered the question have done so by looking at the
facts and concluding, with little analysis, that no violation has occurred. See, eg., United
States v. Lizza Indus., Inc., 775 F.2d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1459
(1986) (use of gross profits rather than net profits to determine the amount subject to forfeiture
under RICO "is keyed to the magnitude of a defendant's criminal enterprise.... [It] does not
destroy this rough proportionality" of crime to punishment); United States v. Kravitz, 738
F.2d 102, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985) (it is not clear that the
Eighth Amendment imposes limitations on RICO forfeitures, but even if it did, forfeiture here
was as proportionate and integral to the racketeering scheme as in other cases); United States
v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 857 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983) (held no violation of
the Eighth Amendment, as the defendant did not raise the issue at the trial level and the jury's
consideration of the degree to which the assets were tainted inured to the defendant's benefit);
United States v. Tunnell, 667 F.2d 1182, 1188 (5th Cir. 1982) (operation of a motel as a place
of prostitution, and the corruption of local officials, demonstrates the magnitude of the offense;
no violation of the Eighth Amendment to forfeit the entire motel).
127. Cf. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 314 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (factual permu-
tations in the eighth amendment context are endless).
case in which no constitutional violation was found. 128 This invites a
"tyranny of small decisions":1 29 since the step from the forfeiture in the
precedential case to the forfeiture before the court will be a small one, the
court can, without realizing it, step over the line separating what is con-
stitutional from what is not.
A consistent eighth amendment analytical framework needs to be
applied to the RICO statute. The principles of previous Supreme Court
opinions discussed above13 provide the framework within which to ana-
lyze criminal RICO forfeitures. An eighth amendment analysis 3
should address whether:
(1) the sanction is criminal; if not, the Eighth Amendment has no
application;1 32
(2) the legislature had the power to impose the sanction for that
offense; if not, the sanction violates the Eighth Amendment;1 33
(3) the type of punishment is novel and whether, despite such nov-
elty, the type of punishment is nonetheless constitutionally valid;1 34
(4) the legislature had a humane purpose in prescribing the penalty;
if not, the penalty is constitutionally invalid;13 5
(5) as between convicted defendants, the sanction is imposed only
infrequently and whether, if it is infrequently imposed, there is a mean-
ingful basis for distinguishing between the cases; if it is imposed infre-
quently and there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the cases, it is
128. See, e-g., United States v. Kravitz, 738 F.2d 102, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1984), cert denied,
470 U.S. 1052 (1985).
129. The phrase is economist Alfred Kahn's. See Tribe, supra note 79, at 162 (quoting
Kahn, 19 Kylos: Int'l Rev. of Soc. Scl 23 (Fasc. 1, 1966)).
130. See supra notes 69-125 and accompanying text.
131. The Supreme Court does not currently follow this approach. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm,
463 U.S. 277, 284-92 (1983). Three reasons justify the departure. First, the Supreme Court is
not infallible. L. TRIBE, supra note 95, at iii (quoting Justice Robert Jackson). Just because
the Court "may have the last word in any particular case about what the law is, the last word
is not for that reason alone the right word." R. DWORKIN, A MATrER OF PRINCIPLE 116
(1985). Second, the Eighth Amendment "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01
(1958). An eighth amendment analysis therefore cannot be fixed or rigid; it must be suffi-
ciently fluid to capture "evolving standards of decency." Id. at 101. Finally, there are com-
peting normative theories of the content of the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g., Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam opinion with each of the nine Justices writing sepa-
rate opinions), Indeed, many eighth amendment opinions approach the Jeffersonian ideal of
seriatum opinions by the judges deciding a case. The strength of the reasons advanced for
inclusion of a principle within the Eighth Amendment should therefore determine whether it is
so included; and the principles in the following framework should be included because they
protect important values and are based either on the Court's holdings or on language consist-
ently used by the Court.
132. See supra notes 81-85 and accompanying text.
133. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
134. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
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constitutionally invalid;" 6
(6) the punishment is proportionate to the severity of the crime; if
not, the punishment is constitutionally invalid;137 and
(7) the punishment comports with basic human dignity as evaluated
in the light of present human knowledge; if not, the punishment is consti-
tutionally invalid.'38
B. The Application of the Eighth Amendment to Criminal
RICO Forfeitures
Under the RICO statute, eighth amendment questions arise in two
types of fact situations: first, when the interests of a predominantly legit-
imate enterprise have over time become commingled with interests in-
volved in a RICO violation; 139 and second, when the interests of an
otherwise legitimate enterprise are involved in a RICO violation but the
violation is minor as compared to the magnitude of the forfeiture."4°
A nonconstitutional safeguard against eighth amendment violations
is the requirement that the government prove a "nexus" between the de-
fendant's conduct and the interest sought to be forfeited. "1 "Nexus" has
been judicially defined as a connection between the two such that the
interest sought to be forfeited is linked to the defendant or affords him a
source of influence over the criminal enterprise. 42 If nexus is construed
narrowly, a criminal RICO forfeiture should not extend beyond that al-
lowable by a forfeiture in rem, because the forfeitable interests will be
limited to those that clearly afforded the defendant a source of influence
over the criminal enterprise, and thus will be, to use in rem terminology,
"tainted." But if construed broadly, as Congress apparently intended, 143
136. See supra notes 105-112 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text.
138. See supra notes 121-125 and accompanying text.
139. This possibility was noted in United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
140. See infra notes 147-168 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1348 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied,
465 U.S. 1005 (1984); United States v. Ragonese, 607 F. Supp. 649, 650-51 (S.D. Fla. 1985),
aff'd, 784 F.2d 403 (11th Cir. 1986).
142. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
143. Statement of Findings and Purpose, The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970).
This is the only substantive federal criminal statute that contains a directive to interpret
the statute broadly, but a similar provision appears in the Criminal Appeals Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 (1982). See Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983).
The directive conflicts with the traditional canon of interpretation, known as the "rule of
lenity," that ambiguities in a criminal statute be strictly construed. See Bifulco v. United
States, 447 U.S 381, 386-87 (1980). At least one court has noted, "it is a different thing en-
tirely [from strict construction of a statute designed to give notice of what is criminal] to apply
that same canon of strict construction to a definitional concept the limits of which do not
determine criminal liability." United States v. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. 134, 138 n.4 (N.D. Ga.
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the nexus between the interest sought to be forfeited and the defendant's
conduct may include interests which are not directly involved in the vio-
lation, and may thereby violate the Eighth Amendment.
Presently there are no statutory safeguards against a broad interpre-
tation of "nexus." 1" Courts have cautioned against prosecutorial zeal in
invoking RICO.145 But should that safeguard fail, and a conviction fol-
low, the resulting mandatory forfeiture146 may violate the Eighth
Amendment. This can best be illustrated by example.1 47 Suppose a
shopkeeper spends forty honest years building up his retail business. He
has no criminal record and is loved by his customers. In a moment of
weakness he commits two acts of mail fraud. Both acts are the result of
an advertisement and involve the use of the business telephones, address,
and inventory. His mail fraud profit is only a small percentage of the
profits that year, and an infinitesimal percentage of the profits made over
the course of his business.
Under the RICO statute, his entire business could be subject to for-
feiture.148 The forfeiture in these circumstances, however, would violate
1979), aff'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 825 (1982). This is wrong: the
same fairness which requires that adequate notice be given, and that statutes giving notice of
criminal liability be strictly construed, also requires that notice of the possible consequences of
judgment be given. That is, fairness requires that notice of both the breadth of criminal liabil-
ity, as well as the depth of criminal liability, be given. See Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387 (the rule of
lenity "applies not only to interpretations of the substantive ambit of criminal prohibitions, but
also to the penalties they impose").
When the statutory language is ambiguous, the rule of lenity does not apply. Russello,
464 U.S. at 29. On the strict construction rule, see generally Note, RICO and the Liberal
Construction Clause, 66 CORNELL L. REv. 167 (1980).
144. For example, in United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 106 S.
Ct. 72 (1985), the court's discussion of "nexus" was as follows: "The defendants next raise the
claim that the government did not prove the nexus between [the assets subject to forfeiture]
and the racketeering enterprise claimed in the indictment. The jury decided this issue by its
verdict [of forfeiture] and [the issue] needs no further comment." Id. at 577. See also United
States v. Ragonese, 607 F. Supp. 649, 652 (S.D. Fla. 1985) ("The 'source of influence' portion
of the statute has not, however, been the topic of. . .in depth analysis by the appellate
courts.").
145. United States v. Huber, 603 F.2d 387, 396 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 927
(1980). See also United States v. Ivic, 700 F.2d 51, 64-65 (2d Cir. 1983); United States v.
Anderson, 626 F.2d 1358, 1364 n.8 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 912 (1981). The
RICO statute is very broad, and the Justice Department was aware of RICO's breadth and
assured Congress it would concentrate on serious cases. See Atkinson, Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-68: Broadest of the Federal Criminal Statutes,
69 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 16 (1978). Some commentators have concluded that the
Justice Department has not followed through on its promise. See Nagel & Plager, RICO, Past
and Future: Some Observations and Conclusions, 2 U. CIN. L. REV. 456, 457-58 (1983).
146. Forfeiture is mandatory upon conviction. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
147. This example is an expansion of one given by the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Marubeni America Corp., 611 F.2d 763, 769-70 n.12 (9th Cir. 1980).
148. See id. (citing United States v. Parness, 503 F.2d 430 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1105 (1975)). But see United States v. Ragonese, 607 F. Supp. 649 (S.D. Fla. 1985), in
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the Eighth Amendment under the seven part analytical framework dis-
cussed above. 149
The first principle is met because the forfeiture is a criminal punish-
ment; the Eighth Amendment therefore applies. 5 '
Second, the Legislature had the power to impose the penalty; that is,
the Legislature had the power to make criminal the proscribed con-
duct, 1 ' and had the power to impose forfeiture as a punishment.' 52
Third, because the forfeiture penalty is not a traditional criminal
penalty, the presumption of constitutionality is weaker than that applied
to traditional criminal penalties.153 This suggests that courts should be
careful to guard against eighth amendment violations when confronted
with a RICO forfeiture, particularly when, as here, the defendant,
although technically subject to criminal forfeiture, is not engaged in the
"organized crime" that Congress sought to address with the RICO
statute.154
Fourth, the Legislature cannot be said to have had an "inhumane"
purpose in prescribing the criminal RICO forfeitures. 15 Certainly Con-
gress intended that the penalty be effective,' 56 and even punitive, 157 but
that is not evidence that Congress had an "inhumane" motive in author-
which two drug deals were conducted in an apartment building otherwise used for legitimate
purposes, by one Anthony Carbonia, a partner involved in a RICO enterprise. Louis
Ragonese, general partner in the entity that owned the building and the other partner in the
RICO enterprise, objected to such use of the building. The court rejected the government's
claim for forfeiture of the building. Id. at 652.
Ragonese, however, is factually distinguishable. Forfeiture of the building was not al-
lowed because "Ragonese did not use his interest in [the building] to further the activities of
the enterprise." Ragonese's partner was the one improperly using the building. Id. The case
therefore leaves open the question whether forfeiture would have been appropriate had
Ragonese, rather than his partner, made the drug deals.
149. See supra notes 131-138 and accompanying text.
150. See supra notes 13 & 81-85 and accompanying text.
151. The RICO statute does not deem criminal formerly noncriminal conduct; rather, the
statute makes the commission of two or more criminal acts an independent criminal offense.
See supra note 21. "Congress is constitutionally entitled to make such behavior an independent
criminal offense." United States v. Field, 432 F. Supp. 55, 61 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), aff'd, 578 F.2d
1371 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
152. Organized crime constitutes "a serious threat to the economic well-being of the Na-
tion," S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79 (1969), so "Congress emphasized the need to
fashion new remedies in order to achieve its far-reaching objectives" of the eradication of or-
ganized crime. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 27 (1983). Although Russello decided a
question of statutory construction, not whether RICO criminal forfeiture is constitutional, the
implication of the opinion is that the need for new remedies confers the congressional power to
fashion such remedies. See id. at 26-28.
153. See supra notes 93-98 and accompanying text.
154. See infra note 161.
155. See supra notes 99-104 and accompanying text.
156. See supra notes 12-20 and accompanying text.
157. Russello, 464 U.S. at 16, 27-28 (citing 116 CONG. REc. 18955 (1970) (remarks of Sen.
McClellan)); United States v. Lizza Indus., Inc., 775 F.2d 492, 498 (2d Cir. 1985).
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izing forfeiture in personam. Penalizing criminals, at any rate, has long
been recognized as a legitimate purpose of criminal sanctions. I"'
Fifth, no problems arise from infrequent imposition of the punish-
ment, 9 because forfeiture is mandatory upon conviction.
Sixth, the RICO method for determining the magnitude of the pen-
alty is flawed: the magnitude of the penalty is coextensive with the mag-
nitude of a defendant's interests in the illegal enterprise, rather than with
his culpability.I' ° Although the two may coincide, they are not necessar-
ily coextensive. For example, forfeiture of the shopkeeper's business, as
required by the statute, is not proportionate to his offense as measured by
the severity of the crime. Although culpable, surely the crime-two min-
utely profitable acts of mail fraud committed by an otherwise honest
shopkeeper unlikely ever to repeat his crime--does not merit such a dra-
conian sanction. What measurable contribution to the goals of RICO-
the eradication of organized crime 6 '-does such a result make? 16 2 The
punishment is not even "in some rough way" '163 proportionate to the
crime. Restitution, fines, community service: all may be adequate to de-
ter and to punish. With more traditional penalties, the sentencing judge
has some measure of discretion.' But the RICO statute gives the judge
no such discretion, and the convicted RICO defendant must be punished
to the fullest.
Seventh, such a penalty does not comport with the principle of "ba-
sic human dignity"' 65 at the core of the Amendment. The penalty in this
158. See H. MORRIS, ON GUILT AND INNOCENCE 33-34 (1976).
159. See supra notes 105-112 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
161. See RICO's Statement of Findings and Purpose, Pub. L. No. 91- 452, 84 Stat. 922,
922-23 (1970). Admittedly, the RICO statute is not limited to "organized crime." See
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3287 (1985) ("Congress wanted to reach both
'legitimate' and 'illegitimate' enterprises."); United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
But Congress' primary intent was application of RICO to organized crime, and application
that strays too far from Congress' primary intent should be closely scrutinized. See Tarlow,
RICO Revisited, supra note 23, at 294 (scope of the RICO statute has been expanded far be-
yond what was intended by Congress); see also Measures Relating to Organized Crime: Hear-
ings Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 496 (1969) [hereinafter Organized Crime Hearings] (RICO was
designed to protect the small or marginal businessman who is most easily subject to invasion by
organized crime).
162. Cf Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972) (White, J., concurring):
[A penalty] has not been considered cruel and unusual punishment in the constitu-
tional sense [when it is] thought justified by the social ends it was deemed to serve.
At the moment that it ceases realistically to further these purposes, however, the
emerging question is whether its imposition in such circumstances would violate the
Eighth Amendment.
163. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
164. See, eg., Note, The Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law, 99 HARV. L. RPv. 1293,
1295 (1986).
165. See supra notes 121-122 and accompanying text.
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example is analogous to Trop v. Dulles. In that case, the punishment
"destroy[ed] for the individual the political existence that was centuries
in the making"; 166 here, the punishment destroys for the individual the
economic existence that was decades in the making. Surely "contempo-
rary human knowledge"' 67 indicates, particularly with a defendant
highly unlikely ever to repeat his errors, that a punishment not go be-
yond that adequate to deter and to punish, for what purpose would fur-
ther punishment serve? The shopkeeper is being caught in a trap
designed for more dangerous game: the harsh penalty of forfeiture was
designed to address the problem of organized crime, not the behavior of
an otherwise honest shopkeeper who merely technically qualifies for the
penalty. 168 Further, the effect of the punishment is too harsh: the shop-
keeper is stripped of his means of support because of two minutely profit-
able, albeit illegal, acts. For all of these reasons, the Eighth Amendment
proscribes forfeiture under these facts.
Application of the eighth amendment analytical framework to the
hypothetical fact situation shows that a forfeiture under the RICO stat-
ute can produce an unconstitutional result. This is particularly true
when, as noted below, no cases to date have found a criminal RICO for-
feiture to violate the Eighth Amendment.
C. The Eighth Amendment and Criminal RICO Forfeitures: The Lower
Federal Courts' Analyses
The idea that the Eighth Amendment might limit RICO's forfeiture
provisions was first suggested in United States v. Huber,169 in which the
defendant was convicted of conducting the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity. The court rejected his eighth
amendment claim with a rather summary analysis. First, for purposes of
punishment, the court reasoned that there was no substantial difference
between a proceeding in rem and a proceeding in personam. 170 Second,
noting that statutes providing for forfeiture in rem of property related to
criminal activity are relatively common, 171 the court held that "at least
where the provision for forfeiture is keyed to the magnitude of a defend-
ant's criminal enterprise, as it is in RICO, the punishment is at least in
some rough way proportional to the crime" and thus satisfies eighth
166. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
167. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962).
168. See Organized Crime Hearings, supra note 160, at 496 (RICO statute designed to pro-
tect small businesses); see also 116 CONG. REc. 35205 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Mikva) (wide
"shotgun" approach taken by the statute will involve activities Congress did not intend to be
covered).
169. 603 F.2d 387, 397 (2d Cir. 1979), cert denied, 445 U.S. 927 (1980).
170. Id. at 396.
171. Id.
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amendment requirements. 72
The Huber court's assertion that forfeiture in personam and in rem
are substantially similar is incorrect. First, with forfeiture in rem the
property must be properly before the court before jurisdiction is pres-
ent, 173 so separate suits must be brought in each district in which prop-
erty sought to be forfeited is located. Since RICO forfeitures are in
personam, only one action need be brought, and jurisdiction over the
property exists regardless of its location. 74 Second, the Eighth Amend-
ment does not apply to forfeitures in rem, because such forfeitures are
against the property and are thus not criminal. 175 Third, the reach of
forfeiture in personam is broader than that of forfeiture in rem. Forfei-
ture in rem reaches only property deemed "guilty" or associated with the
wrong.176 Forfeiture in personam as used in the RICO statute extends to
all of a convicted defendant's interests in the enterprise, regardless
whether those assets themselves are "tainted" by racketeering activity.
17 7
These are three major distinctions between forfeiture in rem and in
personam.
The claim that a particular RICO forfeiture violates the Eighth
Amendment has yet to prevail in the federal courts. Perhaps the factual
situations presented have not been sufficiently compelling; or the courts
may be heeding Congress' directive that the RICO statute be interpreted
broadly. 178 Or perhaps, because the idea that the Eighth Amendment
imposes limits upon RICO criminal forfeiture is relatively new, defense
counsel have not vigorously pressed the claim.
The latter may explain why post-Huber decisions have not devel-
oped a satisfactory eighth amendment analysis for criminal RICO forfeit-
ures. The opinions in United States v. Thevis 179 and United States v.
Grande"8 are analyzed below as examples.
172. Id. at 397. The court emphasized that section 1963(c) then allowed the district court
some discretion in avoiding "draconian" applications of the forfeiture provision. Id. Section
1963(c) has since been amended, but subsection (f) now provides for similar discretion. How-
ever, the statutory language, providing for forfeiture of property "upon such terms and condi-
tions as the courts shall deem proper," cannot protect against eighth amendment violations,
because forfeiture of all "tainted" interests is mandatory. See supra notes 29-30 and accompa-
nying text. The court therefore has no discretion to reduce the extent of the forfeiture.
173. See 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3376.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(k) (Supp. III 1985).
175. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
177. United States v. Cauble, 706 F.2d 1322, 1349 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S.
1005 (1984). See generally Taylor, Forfeiture Under 18 US. C. § 1963-RICO's Most Powerful
Weapon, 17 Am. CRIM. L. REv. 379, 380-90 (1980).
178. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
179. 474 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Ga. 1979), aff'd, 665 F.2d 616 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 456
U.S. 1008 (1982).
180. 620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980).
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In United States v. Thevis, the court rejected a claim that RICO
forfeitures were prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. The court ana-
lyzed whether the forfeiture was "cruel and unusual" by looking to
whether it was either "cruel" or "unusual." As to cruelty, the court
found that: (1) RICO forfeiture is not the complete forfeiture of estate
prohibited by the Constitution 81 and by statute; 8 2 and (2) because
RICO forfeiture is limited to interests or property rights put to illegal
use, it is not excessive, disproportionate, or needlessly severe.18 3 The
court found that the statute was not unusual, citing several federal forfei-
ture in rem statutues. 8 4 The court thus held that "the forfeiture pre-
scribed by [RICO] is neither cruel nor unusual, and the Eighth
Amendment does not prohibit its application." 8 "
The court's reasoning is flawed. Most importantly, a two-tiered
analysis breaking down the phrase "cruel and unusual" into its compo-
nent words is improper. The Supreme Court has rejected such an ap-
proach.1 6 Further, the use of the conjunctive "and" indicates that the
phrase has a connotation distinct from the meaning of the words taken
by themselves.' 87 The eighth amendment question is not whether a crim-
inal punishment is "cruel" or "unusual"; the question is whether it is
prohibited by the constitutional phrase "cruel and unusual."
But even within the Thevis court's framework, the analysis is flawed.
First, although RICO may not revive the total disinheritance and forfei-
ture prohibited by the Constitution and formerly by statute, the RICO
proceeding is in personam and therefore does not require the personifica-
tion fiction to justify forfeiture of the interest.'88 RICO has a much
broader potential application than forfeiture in rem statutes, which are
limited to forfeiture of "guilty" property.'89 Therefore, to the extent
that RICO reaches property that is not an instrument of a crime, it is
"unusual."' 90 Indeed, it was the view of the Ninety-first Congress, which
passed RICO, that the statute constituted by implication a partial repeal
181. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 3, cl. 2.
182. 18 U.S.C. § 3563 (Supp. III 1985). The statute expired November 1, 1986.
183. Thevis, 474 F. Supp. at 140-41.
184. Id. at 141.
185. Id.
186. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 277 n.20 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)
("[The Supreme] Court has never attempted to explicate the meaning of the [Eighth Amend-
ment] simply by parsing its words."). Further, the conjunctive "and" in the phrase "cruel and
unusual" should not be interpreted as limiting the word "cruel." The Amendment proscribes
punishments that are cruel, regardless whether the punishment is also unusual. See Louisiana
ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 465 (1947).
187. Cf. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 739-40 (1978) (a phrase written in the
disjunctive implies that each word in the phrase has a separate meaning).
188. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
189. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
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of the then-existing statutory prohibition against corruption of blood or
forfeiture of estate.191
Second, even if the RICO statute is not excessive, disproportionate,
or needlessly severe as applied to the facts in Thevis, this does not pre-
clude such a finding on other facts. The court did not set forth its rea-
sons for its finding as to cruelty, so the finding thus offers little guidance
beyond the Thevis facts. 92
Third, forfeiture in rem statutes are, for two reasons, an unsound
basis for concluding the penalty is not unusual. The two types of forfei-
ture are different both conceptually, in the determination of what or
whom is being adjudged "guilty," and practically, in that forfeiture in
personam has a potentially broader grasp than forfeiture in rem.1 9 '
Moreover, unusual means "[u]ncommon; not usual, rare." 194 Forfeiture
in personam fits that description. Such forfeiture did not, as a practical
matter, exist before RICO's passage.1 95 The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure were specifically amended to take account of the concept.1 9
6
The analogy to forfeiture in rem as support for the idea that forfeiture in
personam is not unusual must therefore be rejected.1 97
United States v. Grande 19s is a second example of a lower federal
court's eighth amendment analysis of criminal RICO forfeitures. In that
case, the court also rejected the claim that the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibited RICO forfeitures. The court in Grande, as in Thevis, broke down
the phrase "cruel and unusual" into the words "cruel" or "unusual."
As to cruelty, the court found: first, that only "total" forfeiture-
"total disinheritance of one's heirs... and forfeiture of all one's property
and estate"-is constitutionally proscribed, and RICO is narrower and
therefore outside those prohibitions;1 99 and second, that the law has al-
191. See S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 79-80, 124-25 (1969). Butsee United States
v. Grande, 620 F.2d 1026, 1039 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980).
192. Thevis may be treacherous guidance, as it could be one step down the "tyranny of
small decisions." See Tribe, supra note 79, at 162. See also supra note 126 and accompanying
text.
193. This is so because forfeiture in rem reaches only property deemed "guilty" or associ-
ated with the wrong. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text. Forfeiture in personam as
used in the RICO statute extends to all of a convicted defendant's interests in the enterprise,
regardless whether those assets themselves are "tainted" by racketeering activity. See supra
note 31 and accompanying text.
194. BLACK'S LAW DCTIONARY 1380 (5th ed. 1979).
195. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
196. See supra note 55.
197. Indeed, since the Eighth Amendment does not even apply to forfeiture in rem, see
supra note 71 and accompanying text, it is ironic to use an anaology to forfeiture in rem as a
basis for finding that forfeiture in personam does not violate that Amendment.
198. 620 F.2d 1026 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 830 (1980).
199. Id. at 1039 (emphasis in original).
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ways recognized forfeiture of the instruments of crime,200 which is what
RICO does.20 1 Therefore, since the statute does not "revive any penalty
long in disuse," it is not "cruel.""2 2
As to "unusual," the court found that: (1) both forfeiture in per-
sonam and in rem impose penalties upon persons and, apart from proce-
dure, are functional equivalents; and (2) other federal forfeiture in rem
statutes exist, so the penalty is not "unusual."20 3 Finally, the court
found that since "[t]he magnitude of the forfeiture is directly keyed to
the magnitude of the defendant's interest in the [illegal] enterprise ... it
is not cruel and unusual in the constitutional sense. ' '204
This analysis is also flawed. Again, the constitutional phrase "cruel
and unusual" cannot properly be analyzed by breaking it down into its
constituent words.205 Second, legal opinion differs as to whether RICO
is outside the express statutory prohibitions against forfeiture of estate.20 6
Third, the law has long recognized forfeiture of the instruments of
crime,20 7 but only when the property has been deemed guilty and forfei-
ture limited to the guilty property.208 RICO goes beyond this: the prop-
erty need not be guilty to be forfeited. 20 9 To the extent, then, that it
reaches untainted property, the RICO statute does something very novel
in American law. Finally, forfeiture in personam and in rem are not
functional equivalents. 210 The analogy to extant federal forfeiture in rem
statutes therefore fails.
V. A Recommendation
The courts' analyses of the Eighth Amendment to RICO criminal
forfeitures has suffered for two reasons. First, the lower courts have not
applied a correct or even consistent eighth amendment analysis to the
problem.211 The seven-part framework developed above provides such
an analysis. The second problem, however, lies not with judicial analysis
of the problem but with the RICO method of determining punishment.
Punishment should be coextensive with culpability; that is, punishment
200. Id. at 1039 (citing Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974);
United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715 (1970)).
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 54.
207. See, e.g., The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
208. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 680-85 (1974) (giving
a brief history and illustrations of the forfeiture of "guilty" property).
209. See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 193-196 and accompanying text.
211. See supra notes 169-210 and accompanying text.
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should fit the crime.212 This is the principle of proportionality so deeply
embedded in our jurisprudence. But the RICO statute provides for a
different measurement: the punishment fits the defendant's interests in
the enterprise.213
In two types of situations a defendant's interests may not necessarily
be coextensive with culpability. First, when the interests of a predomi-
nantly legitimate enterprise have over time become commingled with in-
terests involved in a RICO violation, all of those interests could be
subject to RICO criminal forfeitures. 21' Although a defendant's culpa-
bility will vary with the magnitude and seriousness of the RICO crimes
he committed, RICO forfeiture depends not on culpability but on the
extent of the defendant's interests having a nexus with the RICO
enterprise.215
The second situation where a defendant's interests may not neces-
sarily be coextensive with culpability was illustrated in the above hypo-
thetical:216 when the interests of an otherwise legitimate business are
technically involved in a RICO violation but the violation is minor as
compared to the magnitude of the forfeiture.
To address the eighth amendment problems arising in the first situa-
tion, the statute should be amended so as to require that the degree of
criminal taint of the assets be established by the government. A return to
the forfeiture in rem idea that only guilty property can be reached217
would solve the eighth amendment problems arising in this situation.
Forfeiture of only guilty property is more proportionate-a better "fit"-
to the crime, more humane, and more in accord with basic human dig-
nity, because such forfeiture is a more accurate measure of the defend-
ant's culpability. This is so because just as a person's business assets will
grow with the extent of a business, a RICO defendant's interests in the
RICO enterprise will grow with the extent of his RICO criminal activity.
One criticism of forfeiture in rem is that forfeiture can be avoided
simply by transferring the tainted assets to a legitimate enterprise.218
This criticism is easily met: the mingling of tainted and untainted inter-
ests should be deemed not to free the tainted interests of their taint, and
transfer of the interests should leave the tainted interests subject to for-
feiture.2 19 To the extent that the transferred tainted interests are not eas-
ily separable from the tainted interests, forfeiture of a monetary
212. See supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text.
213. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
214. This posssibility was noted in Huber, 603 F.2d at 397.
215. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
216. See supra notes 147-148 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 56-68 and accompanying text.
218. United States v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 857 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 825 (1983).
219. That is, the tainted interests should be deemed traceable to the illegitimate activity
and still subject to forfeiture.
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equivalent to the tainted interests should be required and deemed an ac-
ceptable substitute for the forfeiture of the tainted interests themselves;
that is, the mingling of tainted and untainted interests should be concep-
tually viewed as a "sale" of the tainted interests, with the "taint" now
residing in the monetary equivalent of the now-mingled tainted interests.
The monetary equivalent should then be subject to forfeiture. Such a
procedure is conceptually a forfeiture in rem, because only "tainted"
property is being forfeited.
But such a change alone would not leave RICO immune from an
eighth amendment attack in the second situation, where the interests of
an otherwise legitimate business are technically involved in a RICO vio-
lation but the violation is minor as compared to the magnitude of the
potential forfeiture. The eighth amendment concern here is the dispro-
portionality between the culpability of the defendant and the magnitude
of the forfeiture. The problem is that forfeiture is mandatory upon con-
viction; RICO forfeitures, therefore, should not be mandatory. Discre-
tion is needed to take account of the different factual situations that
might be presented-for example, a sophisticated and organized extor-
tion enterprise as compared to a shopkeeper engaging in relatively harm-
less acts of mail fraud. The trial judge should abide by the jury's
determination of the defendant's guilt, but the judge should then have the
discretion to mitigate the harshness of the punishment. The judge should
in appropriate cases be able to provide for alternative punishments; in the
shopkeeper example, perhaps restitution and a fine would be appropriate.
For two reasons courts will infrequently exercise this discretion.
First, prosecutors exercise discretion in deciding whom to prosecute
under the RICO statute.22 The defendants should in theory be legiti-
mate targets for the prosecution: that is, engaged in organized crime,
which was Congress' concern when it passed RICO.221 Second, success-
ful eighth amendment claims in the amended RICO forfeiture setting
will be rare;222 therefore, under an amended RICO statute, forfeiture will
still be imposed in the vast majority of cases. But by allowing for discre-
tion, punishment will be commensurate with a defendant's culpability
rather than with the extent of his interests. The punishment will fit the
crime-an idea fundamental to American jurisprudence.223 Such a pro-
cedure allows society to punish RICO felons, but no more harshly than
deserved. Further, allowing discretion will not detract from RICO's
goals of removing profit gained from criminal activity and preventing
criminal enterprises from continuing:224 profits gained from criminal ac-
tivity will be "tainted" and still subject to forfeiture, and thus the eco-
220. See Atkinson, supra note 145, at 16.
221. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
222. See Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 374 (1982) (per curiam).
223. See supra notes 113-120 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
nomic base of criminal enterprises will still be attacked, preventing the
enterprises from continuing.
Conclusion
The RICO statute provides for the mandatory forfeiture of a defend-
ant's assets "affording a source of influence over" the RICO criminal
enterprise. Forfeiture in American history has traditionally been in rem:
imposed in a civil proceeding and against property which has been
deemed "guilty." The RICO method of forfeiture, hoiever, is unusual:
it is in personam and imposed against the defendant personally as a crim-
inal sanction.
Since RICO forfeiture is a criminal sanction, the Eighth Amend-
ment-which applies only to criminal sanctions-limits the extent to
which a convicted RICO defendant's interests in the RICO enterprise
may be forfeited. To date the Supreme Court has not applied an eighth
amendment analysis to RICO criminal forfeiture, but the Court's opin-
ions provide an analytical framework for analyzing RICO criminal for-
feitures. Application of the analysis to the RICO statute shows that it is
constitutional but can be applied so as to yield an unconstitutional result.
Lower courts have not developed or applied a correct or consistent
eighth amendment analysis to criminal RICO forfeitures. The principal
problem is that the constitutional phrase "cruel and unusual punish-
ment" has been improperly analyzed as if it read "cruel" or "unusual"
punishment. In addition, courts have improperly analogized forfeiture in
rem to forfeiture in personam.
Application of the analytical framework to a hypothetical fact situa-
tion reveals two problems with the RICO statute: (1) the punishment of
forfeiture is coextensive with the RICO defendant's interests having a
source of influence over the RICO enterprise, rather than with the de-
fendant's culpability; and (2) because forfeiture under the RICO statute
is mandatory, the judge does not have the discretion to impose a lesser
penalty. An unconstitutional result can flow from either one of these
flaws in the statute.
The statute needs to be changed. First, it should be amended to
provide for forfeiture only of "guilty" or "tainted" interests, because the
extent of such interests is a more accurate measure of the defendant's
culpability. Second, the statute should be amended so as to give the trial
judge the discretion to impose a different penalty. Such discretion is
needed to ensure that an unconstitutional result, such as forfeiture
wholly disproportionate to the seriousness of the crime, is not reached.
By amending the statute Congress can still ensure that "crime does
not pay." But the aim of the statute would be more precise, and those
not meriting its treatment would not be caught in its trap. The worthy
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goal of eliminating organized crime could still be reached, without sacri-
ficing the fairness so fundamental to our jurisprudence.
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